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A study on the information exchange that builds confidence 
between States Parties to the Biological and Toxin  
Weapons Convention (BTWC)  
  
 
 
We are now halfway through the intersessional process between the Review 
Conferences of the Biological Weapons Convention of 2006 and 2011. The 
process has led to many constructive and substantive debates between 
experts, members of government and representatives from NGOs and 
industry. Yet, despite these useful and constructive debates there is still a lot 
of work ahead of us. Switzerland is particularly concerned by the fact that the 
Convention still lacks a system to ensure compliance. In the absence of such 
a verification mechanism the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) remain 
the only tool available to States Parties to enhance transparency and build 
confidence. Participation in the CBM mechanism has steadily increased until 
2007, and it is crucial that this positive trend continues in the coming years.  
 
Switzerland believes that one of the most important ways to enhance the 
credibility and strength of the Convention is to ensure that the CBM 
mechanism is effective. This is why Switzerland first funded a study on CBM 
data collection processes in 2007. Building on the success of the first study, 
and convinced that the debate on the CBM mechanism has to be continued 
throughout the present intersessional process, Switzerland has commissioned 
this follow-up study. Like its predecessor, the present study was carried out by 
the BIOS Centre of the London School of Economics (LSE).  
 
This year’s study aims to provide States Parties with new empirical data that 
addresses the quality of the data submitted. It aims to contribute to the debate 
on the content of the CBMs in an uncontroversial manner, and we hope that it 
will provide helpful guidance in the challenging discussion on CBMs ahead of 
us in the build-up to the Review Conference of 2011. 
 
We would like to thank the author, Dr Filippa Lentzos, for her outstanding 
work. We would also like to thank Mr Richard Lennane and Dr Piers Millett 
from the Implementation Support Unit for lending their support to the study in 
spite of their ever more busy schedules. And last but not least our thank you 
goes to everyone who took part in one of the focus groups or the one-on-one 
interviews, or who contributed to this study in any other manner.  
 
 
 
 
Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud 
Political Affairs Secretariat 
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
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• Since the current forms were introduced in 1991, there has been an 
increase both in the number of States Parties declaring maximum 
containment facilities on CBM A Part 1 and in the number of maximum 
containment facilities declared. In 2007, 40 States Parties declared a total 
of 268 facilities, up from 26 States Parties declaring 115 facilities in 1992. 
Of the facilities declared only a small number are categorised as BSL4, the 
majority (around 80 percent) of the facilities have a lower BSL level. 
 
• There has also been a gradual increase in the number of biodefence 
programmes declared on CBM A Part 2, from 13 programmes in 1992 to 
25 programmes in 2007. 
 
• National biodefence programmes can be categorised as small, medium 
and large as a helpful way to discuss the typical kinds of information and 
level of detail submitted by States Parties on their CBM returns. 
 
• To properly interpret CBM returns, you need to be able to contextualise the 
information provided in terms of the particular state structures and funding 
sources, the organisations involved and their locations, the level of 
infrastructure, the institutional affiliation of the facilities, and the level of 
involvement of contractors and manufacturers. 
 
• There is not one piece of information that by itself can provide confidence 
that programmes and activities are not in contravention of the Convention. 
Individual pieces of information are only “part of the puzzle.” 
 
• Additional information does not necessarily give you more insight, but it 
provides more opportunities to corroborate and cross-check information. 
 
• Key to improving transparency and strengthening confidence between 
States Parties is to increase the level of participation in the CBM 
mechanism. CBM requirements are not constraints on action but 
declarations of openness, and a failure to honour commitments under the 
mechanism indicates either a lack of interest in openness or a lack of 
belief in the regime of compliance. 
 
• The regular exchange of data on current activities strengthens the regime 
of compliance by maximising the transparency of national patterns of 
normal activity. Complete, accurate and annual declarations are of the 
utmost importance so that deviations from the norm can be identified and 
information can be compared over time. 
 
• A review of the questions asked on the CBM forms and a modernisation of 
the reporting process is called for. 
 
 
K e y  f i n d i n g s  
  
 
 
The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) of the Biological Weapons 
Convention were designed to prevent or reduce the occurrence of 
ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and to improve international co-operation 
in the field of peaceful biological activities. Developing out of the crisis of 
confidence among States Parties that had resulted from the unresolved 
allegations of non-compliance, rapid developments in science and technology 
and other pressures in the early 1980s, they were agreed at the Second 
Review Conference in 1986, elaborated at a meeting of scientific and 
technical experts in 1987, and modified and considerably expanded at the 
Third Review Conference in 1991. They have not been modified since, 
although the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 agreed on various 
improvements to the mechanisms for submission and distribution. 
 
One of the main functions of the CBMs is to allow and encourage States 
Parties to resolve compliance concerns co-operatively through exchanges of 
information. The experience of the past years, however, has suggested that 
the CBM mechanism may benefit from a substantial review to further improve 
it. 
 
A central concern relates to the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data 
submitted. To address this it is fundamentally important to understand the 
particular challenges and needs arising in different national contexts and how 
they impact on CBM submissions. In 2007 Switzerland sponsored a study on 
national data collection processes in order to draw out the experience and 
perspectives of those tasked with preparing the CBM return and to provide 
concrete examples of problems and solutions, of models, and of lessons 
learned in the submission process. The resulting report – National data 
collection processes for CBM submissions: Revisiting the Confidence Building 
Measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention after twenty 
years of CBM submissions – was launched and distributed during the Meeting 
of States Parties in December 2007. Additional copies are available from the 
Permanent Mission of Switzerland in Geneva (www.eda.admin.ch/geneva). It 
is hoped the report has been, and continues to be, constructive not only for 
States Parties submitting CBMs for the first time, but also for States that have 
consistently been submitting them for some time and for which a procedural 
review might be helpful. 
 
Another key concern relates to the kind of data exchanged, and whether, in 
practice, the information supplied enhances transparency and builds the 
necessary degree of confidence between States Parties that there is no 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological and 
toxin agents in contravention of the Convention. Building on the 2007 study, 
Switzerland has this year sponsored a second study focused on the 
information asked for on the CBM forms and the information submitted by 
States Parties. 
  
A n  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  s t u d y  
The aim of the study is to provide novel empirical data addressing the quality 
of the data submitted in order to sustain the political focus on CBMs and to 
encourage further debate among States Parties in the lead-up to the 2011 
Review Conference. It attempts to contribute to the content debate in an 
uncontroversial way and, as such, has used fictitious CBM returns drawn 
together on the basis of actual returns to provide concrete materials for 
discussion without directing comments at any one State Party. The “mock” 
CBM returns worked well in the expert discussions carried out for the study, 
and they can easily be adopted for use in further discussions about the 
information contained in CBMs. It is hoped that the findings from the expert 
discussions, combined with the quantitative data generated, will be helpful in 
the often difficult and sensitive discussion on the kind and quality of CBM 
information submitted for the BWC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
In exploring the information asked for on the CBM forms and the information 
submitted by States Parties, the study narrowed its focus to one of the seven 
forms through which information is exchanged: CBM A.  
 
CBM A exchanges data – including name, location, scope and general 
description of activities – on research centres and laboratories that meet very 
high national and international safety standards established for handling, for 
permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and 
community risk or specialise in permitted biological activities directly related to 
the Convention. Part 1 of CBM A concentrates on research centres and 
laboratories, Part 2 on national biological defence research and development 
programmes. Together these two parts comprise some of the most pertinent 
information regularly exchanged through the CBM mechanism.  
 
The study approached the information submitted under CBM A in three ways: 
 
1. To provide a general context and quantitative framework for the study, 
patterns and general trends were examined in the numbers of facilities and 
current biodefence programmes submitted by all States Parties over time. 
The data was provided by the Implementation Support Unit upon specific 
request from Switzerland. The questions asked were: 
 
• How many facilities having maximum containment laboratories were 
declared by each of the States Parties submitting returns at five-
year intervals since the forms were modified at the Third Review 
conference in 1991 (i.e. in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007)?  
• How many States Parties submitting CBM returns since the forms 
were modified at the Third Review conference in 1991 (i.e. in 1992, 
1997, 2002 and 2007) declared a current national biological 
defence research and development programme?  
 
2. To consider the different types of information and level of detail submitted 
by States Parties for CBM A, the study analysed a sample of CBM returns 
from 23 States Parties. Over the timeframe 1992–2007 (from when the 
modified forms were first introduced until the most recent completed year 
available), the average number of annual CBM submissions has been 45, 
and the sample therefore equates to approximately half of the returns 
available in any one year.  
 
The sampled CBMs represented five of the six official UN languages; 74% 
(17/23) were in English, 9% (2/23) in Russian, 9% (2/23) in Spanish, 4% 
(1/23) in French and 4% (1/23) in Chinese. Every effort was made to 
include CBMs in Arabic, but this was regrettably not achieved. The 
proportion of languages included in the sample is a fair representation of 
the languages that CBMs have been submitted in over the 1992–2007 
timeframe, where approximately 72% of CBM returns have been submitted 
D e s i g n  o f  t h e  s t u d y  
in English, 10% in Spanish, 8% in Russian, 6% in French, 2% in Chinese 
and 2% in Arabic.  
 
Approximately half the CBM returns sampled were publicly available, 
either on the public section of the BWC website or on national websites. 
The additional CBM returns were requested bilaterally through official 
channels, asking whether States would agree to participate in the study 
and make parts of their CBMs available to an outside expert for temporary 
consultation.  
 
The analysis of the sampled CBMs focused primarily on Part 2 of CBM A, 
on national biodefence programmes, as this is the information most 
relevant to the purpose of the CBM mechanism – i.e. to resolve 
compliance concerns with the Convention. On the basis of the sample, a 
set of distinct, generic answers to CBM A Part 2 were developed for small, 
medium and large biodefence programmes. 
 
3. To encourage expert analysis and to provoke narrative and reflective 
considerations about the information contained in the CBMs, the mock 
CBM returns developed for small, medium and large biodefence 
programmes were used as a basis for moderated discussions in small 
groups of national experts. Three focus groups were conducted in all; two 
of these were with Western Group experts, the third was with NAM experts 
representing seven different States Parties. The groups each contained 
between five and ten experts with a mix of backgrounds (arms control and 
nonproliferation, defence, health, security, life sciences). 
 
In addition to the focus groups, a small number (6) of one-to-one 
conversations were carried out with arms control experts and ex-biological 
weapons inspectors. 
 
Questions asked during the discussions included: What could the experts 
conclude from the information provided? Which aspects of the information 
were particularly relevant? Did the information provided demonstrate 
transparency? Could the information engender a false sense of security? 
How would the experts judge when they had sufficient information to be 
confident that the programmes described were not offensive? What 
additional information would help build more confidence that the 
programmes described were not in contravention of the Convention? 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Since the forms were modified at the Third Review Conference in 1991, there 
has been an increase both in the number of States Parties declaring 
maximum containment facilities on CBM A Part 1 and in the number of 
maximum containment facilities declared. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this 
graphically at five-year intervals starting in 1992, and Table 1 provides more 
detailed information in tabular form.  
 
In obtaining these figures, each facility declared was counted. Where ‘nothing 
new to declare’ was recorded on the form, the last substantive return for the 
form was checked and the number of facilities in that declaration was 
considered to have been re-declared in the relevant year. On occasion, a 
State would indicate they had nothing to declare in form 0 but then proceed to 
make a declaration in CBM A Part 1. These declarations are accounted for in 
the data presented. 
 
The most recent figures we have is that, in 2007, 40 States Parties declared a 
total of 268 facilities, up from 26 States Parties declaring 115 facilities in 1992. 
 
Of the facilities declared only a small number are categorised as BSL4, the 
majority (around 80 percent) of the facilities have a lower BSL level. For 
example, in 1992, 81% (21/26) of the States that declared facilities, reported 
facilities with lower than a BSL4 classification; in 2002, 79% (23/29) of the 
States that declared facilities, reported facilities with lower than a BSL4 
classification. 
Figure 1: Number of SP Declaring Maximum 
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T r e n d s  i n  n u m b e r s  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  a n d   
b i o d e f e n c e  p r o g r a m m e s  s u b m i t t e d  
Table 1: Summary information of CBM A Part 1 on maximum containment facilities at five-
yearly intervals since the current forms were introduced at the Third Review Conference. 
 
 
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of States Parties submitting 
information on CBM A Part 1 (from Table 1) into those declaring 1) a single 
maximum containment facility, 2) between two and five facilities, 3) between 
six and ten facilities, and 4) more than ten facilities, at the five-yearly intervals.  
 
As illustrated, the majority of States Parties declare less than six facilities; the 
number of States Parties declaring between six and ten facilities has 
remained similar over the years at around half a dozen; and the number of 
States Parties declaring more than ten facilities has gradually increased from 
1 in 1992 to 5 in 2007. 
 
The data displayed in Table 2 is graphically illustrated in Figures 3-6 on the 
next page. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of number of States Parties declaring maximum containment facilities. 
 
 
 
1992 1997 2002 2007
Number of SP declaring a
single facility 5 12 10 16
Number of SP declaring
between two and five facilities 13 10 10 13
Number of SP declaring
between six and ten facilities 7 5 7 6
Number of SP declaring more
than ten facilities 1 3 2 5
1992 1997 2002 2007
Number of SP to BWC 127 140 147 159
Number of SP submitting
CBMs 43 46 41 64
Number of SP submitting
information on Form A1 26 30 29 40
Average number of facilities
declared per SP 4.4 4.8 4.2 6.7
Total number of facilities
declared 115 143 121 268
Figure 3: Breakdown of Number of SP Declaring 
Maximum Containment Facilities in 1992
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Figure 4: Breakdown of Number of SP Declaring 
Maximum Containment Facilities in 1997
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Figure 5: Breakdown of Number of SP Declaring 
Maximum Containment Facilities in 2002
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Figure 6: Breakdown of Number of SP Declaring 
Maximum Containment Facilities in 2007
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Table 3 and Figures 7-10 show that there has also been a gradual increase in 
the number of current biodefence programmes declared on CBM A Part 2 
over the 1992–2007 timeframe, from 13 programmes in 1992 to 25 
programmes in 2007. 
 
The data is unable to tell us is whether this increase is due to newly 
submitting States Parties with biodefence programmes, or due to States 
Parties that have been submitting CBM A Part 2 for some time but which have 
newly acquired a biodefence programme. 
 
Again, as with CBM A Part I, where ‘nothing new to declare’ was recorded on 
the CBM A Part 2, the last substantive return for the form was checked and 
the programmes in that declaration were considered to have been re-declared 
in the relevant year. On occasion, a State would indicate they had nothing to 
declare in form 0 but then proceed to make a declaration in CBM A Part 1. 
These declarations are accounted for in the data presented. 
 
The remainder of this report focuses on biodefence programmes and provides 
a more qualitative picture of the kind of information and the level of detail 
submitted by States Parties on CBM A Part 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
1992 1997 2002 2007 
Number of SP submitting CBMs 43 46 41 59 
Number of SP providing information 
on biodefence programmes 13 17 18 25 
 
Table 3: Summary information of CBM A Part 2 on biological defence programmes at five-
yearly intervals since the current forms were introduced at the Third Review Conference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: 1992
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Figure 8: 1997
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Figure 9: 2002
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Figure 10: 2007
25
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Biodefence programme declared No biodefence programme declared
     
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CBM A Part 2 requires States Parties to declare whether there is a national 
programme to conduct biological defence research and development within 
their territories, or under their jurisdiction or control anywhere. The sorts of 
activities that are considered relevant to a biodefence programme include 
prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, 
aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection and 
decontamination. If a State Party does have a biodefence programme – and in 
2007 25 State Parties declared that they did – CBM A Part 2 requires that the 
State describe the programme in terms of its objective, its funding source and 
amount, the contractors involved (if any), the organisational structure of the 
programme and the reporting relationships, and the principal research and 
development activities conducted. For each facility involved in the programme 
the State Party is also required to detail the name and location of the facility, 
the floor area of the laboratories, the number and kind of personnel working 
there, the facility’s source and level of funding, its publication policy and 
annual list of publications, and the kind of biodefence work conducted. A copy 
of the CBM A Part 2 form can be found in the appendix. 
 
In analysing the information submitted by States Parties on CBM A Part 2, the 
study divided the biodefence programmes described into three categories: 
small, medium and large. To avoid highlighting any one State Party’s 
biodefence programme, while at the same time keeping the information as 
authentic as possible, the study drew on several actual returns to develop a 
fictitious, or “mock”, CBM A Part 2 return for each of the three categories of 
biodefence programme. 
 
Initially, a mock CBM A Part 2 return was developed for a medium-sized 
biodefence programme. This is detailed in the following three pages 
illustrating the typical kinds of information and level of detail submitted by 
States Parties. The fictitious programme is focused on detection of biological 
agents and toxins, on developing countermeasures, and on decontamination. 
The programme is wholly funded by the Ministry of Defence at an annual rate 
of GBP 5.5 million, with approximately 30% of the funds expended in contract 
or non-defence facilities. GBP 5.5 million is toward the lower end of medium-
sized biodefence programme budgets, which range from GBP 5 million to 
GBP 50 million. However, few of what could be classified as medium-sized 
programmes submitted under the CBM mechanism to date have programmes 
at the higher end of this spectrum and a lower value was therefore chosen. 
The institutions involved in the fictitious programme are the Defence Science 
and Technology Organisation and the Biological Defence Institute, both within 
the Ministry of Defence. Only one facility is declared as part of the 
programme, containing a total laboratory floor area of 780m2 with BSL3 as the 
highest containment level. The total number of personnel working at the 
facility is 78, approximately two fifths of which are military. 78 is again toward 
the low end of the personnel range at medium-sized biodefence programmes, 
I n f o r m a t i o n  s u b m i t t e d  o n  n a t i o n a l   
b i o d e f e n c e  p r o g r a m m e s   
but in keeping with the GBP 5.5 million budget. The ratio of scientists to 
technicians in the fictitious programme is almost equal, in slight favour of 
scientists. The scientific disciplines represented cover core life science 
disciplines, as well as medicine and veterinary medicine. Like the biodefence 
programme as a whole, the facility is entirely funded by the Ministry of 
Defence, with half of the funding targeting research, a quarter targeting 
development, and a quarter targeting testing and evaluation. The facility has a 
policy of publishing in the open literature and references to published work are 
listed. Finally, a fairly comprehensive description of the biodefence work 
carried out at the facility is provided. 
 
Having developed a complete mock CBM A Part 2 return for a medium-sized 
programme, slimmed-down versions were then developed for both a small 
and a large biodefence programme. As pages 19 and 20 show, these returns 
highlight the typical sorts of information provided on the scope and description 
of the programme, the source and level of funding, the facilities relevant to the 
programme, and the personnel involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Scope and description of programme  
 
Assessment of the hazards that may be faced by the military from biological agents 
and toxins. Detection of biological agents and toxins using immunological, 
biochemical and physical detection methods. Medical countermeasures against the 
infections or intoxications from biological agents and toxins. Decontamination of 
biological agents and toxins. Studies on the mode of action and toxicity of toxins and 
the mode of action and infectivity of biological agents. 
 
 
Funding 
 
Total funding for programme:    GBP 5.5M 
Source(s) of funding:     Ministry of Defence 
 
Proportion of total funds expended in  
contracted or other non-defence facilities:   approx. 30% 
 
Objectives and research areas of the  
programme performed by contractors  
or in other facilities: Contractors are used on various 
research topics in support of the 
main biodefence programme. 
 
 
Organisational Structure and Reporting Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facilities relevant to the programme 
 
Name: Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation 
 
Location: Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation 
 4550 Place, Country   
 (xoy north xoy east)  
Ministry of Defence
Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation
Biological Defence 
Institute
Contractors
M o c k  C B M  A  P a r t  2  f o r  a  m e d i u m - s i z e d  b i o d e f e n c e  p r o g r a m m e  
Floor area of laboratory: 
 BSL 2      450m2  
 BSL 3      330m2 
Total lab floor area:     780m2 
 
 
Personnel 
 
Total number of personnel:    73  
 
Division of personnel: 
Military      28 
Civilian     45 
 
Division of personnel by category: 
Scientists      37 
Engineers      0 
Technicians      31 
Administrative and support staff   5 
 
Scientific disciplines represented:  Bacteriology, biochemistry, 
biotechnology, chemistry, 
immunology, medicine, 
microbiology, molecular biology, 
parasitology, pharmacology, 
toxicology, veterinary medicine, 
virology. 
 
Contractor staff: 2 
  
Source(s) of funding: Ministry of Defence 
 
Funding levels for:      
Research      50% 
Development      25% 
Test and evaluation    25% 
 
Publication policy: All staff are encouraged to 
publish their research in the open 
literature. 
 
List of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from work during the previous 
12 months:      
Jensen A, Bell R, Connors C, Singh IA, Wahlberg A, Ajana B (2004) 
‘Engineering antibodies for biosensor technologies’ Advances in Applied 
Microbiology 54: 153-86. 
Abi-Rached J, Burchell K, Amorese V, Novas C, Franklin S (2004) ‘The twin 
arginine translocation system is essential for virulence of Yersinia 
pseudotuberculosis. Journal of Bacteriology 72:1893-1921. 
Frazzetto G and Rose N (2004) ‘Biotechnology for autonomous sensing 
systems: opportunities and challenges’ Journal of Defence Science 8(2): 634-66. 
Kaftanazi L, Kim L, Klein K, Reubi D, Schmid S, Zhang J, Kabatoff M, Clinch 
M (2004) ‘The cytotoxic effect of anthrax lethal toxin on human lung cells in vitro and 
the protective action of bovine antibodies to PA and LF’ Journal of Applied oxicology 
24(3): 243-75. 
Description of biodefence work  
 
Assessment of hazards: Current work includes studying the inhalation toxicity of a 
wide range of materials and the aerosol survival of pathogenic bacteria and viruses. 
Operational analysis is also being conducted to examine the effects of BW attack on 
our forces, and to assess those countermeasures that might be adopted to minimise 
these effects.   
 
Detection of biological agents and toxins: Immunological and gene based techniques 
for rapid identification of BW agents are being investigated. Recombinant and 
colostrum derived antibodies, and combinatorial peptides are being produced to a 
number of BW agents, including B. pseudomallei, Bacillus anthracis, anthrax toxins 
and ricin.  Platforms for the amplification of antibody avidity, such as self-assembling 
gels, are also being investigated. Binding inhibition and cytotoxicity assays are being 
developed to assess the usefulness of potential therapeutic agents such as 
antibodies, peptides and aptamers. Research on PCR assays for the rapid detection 
of potential BW agents focuses on the evaluation of diagnostic tools that enable rapid 
detection of microbial antibiotic resistance and genetically manipulated bacteria. 
Assessment of particle characterisation for provision of rapid warning of a bio-aerosol 
are also carried out, as are studies on detection of biological material using mass 
spectrometry and other physico-chemical methods to determine their utility for field 
detection of biological toxins and BWC verification procedures – this work has 
included the analysis of ricin and crude extracts of ricin by MALDI and FT-ICR mass 
spectrometry.  
   
Medical countermeasures: Research is carried out on new drugs and vaccines and 
delivery systems, for example microencapsulated antibiotics and vaccines. 
Microorganisms other than NDV and BG which have been used in the biological 
defence program are Bacillus anthracis, Brucella species (abortus, melitensis, 
neotomae, ovis and suis), Burkholderia species (mallei, pseudomallei), F. tularensis, 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Yersinia enterocolitica, Yersinia pestis, various 
influenza virus strains, Western Equine encephalitis, Eastern Equine Encephalitis, 
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis and Chikungunya. Toxins used include botulinum 
toxin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, ricin and various venoms from marine 
organisms, reptiles and insects. Outdoor studies have involved only NDV and BG. 
 
Decontamination: This has included training personnel in both the theory and 
practice of handling vectors, microorganisms and toxins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Scope and description of programme   
 
Development of rapid detection, identification and characterisation tests for biological 
agents and toxins based on laser-induced Fluorescence, chip array, PCR, 
immunological techniques and masspectrometric methods. 
 
Development of prophylaxis and medical countermeasures against biological agents 
and toxins. Model pathogens studied: Francisella tularensis, Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, mycotoxins. 
 
 
Funding 
 
Total funding for programme:    GBP 2.14M 
Source(s) of funding:     Ministry of Defence 
 
 
Facilities relevant to the programme 
 
Floor area of laboratory: 
 BSL 2      200m2  
 BSL 3      60m2 
  
Total lab floor area:     260m2 
 
 
Personnel 
 
Total number of personnel:    20  
 
Division of personnel: 
Military      0 
Civilian     20 
 
Division of personnel by category: 
Scientists      14 
Engineers      1 
Technicians      4 
Administrative and support staff   1 
 
Scientific disciplines represented:  Chemistry, immunology, 
microbiology, molecular biology, 
parasitology, pharmacology, 
toxicology. 
 
Source(s) of funding: Ministry of Defence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M o c k  C B M  A  P a r t  2  f o r  a  s m a l l  b i o d e f e n c e  p r o g r a m m e  
  
 
Scope and description of programme   
 
Assessment of the hazards that may be faced by the military from biological agents 
and toxins. Characterisation of pathogenicity and dissemination characteristics of 
biological agents. Research is being conducted on microorganisms such as Bacillus 
anthracis and viruses such as Junin, Hantaan, Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley fever, 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis and the rikettsiae Coxiella burnetii. Research is also 
conducted on protein neurotoxins such as botulinum and low molecular weight toxins 
such as saxitoxin. Detection, warning, identification, diagnosis and monitoring of 
biological and toxin agents. Development and testing in laboratories and under field 
conditions of vaccines, antibiotics, antivirals and antitoxins, and of protective 
equipment and biodecontamination capabilities.  
 
  
Funding 
 
Total funding for programme:    GBP 130M 
Source(s) of funding:     Ministry of Defence 
 
 
Facilities relevant to the programme 
 
Floor area of laboratory: 
 BSL 2      4380m2  
 BSL 3      2550m2 
 BSL 4      540m2 
 
Total lab floor area:     7470m2 
 
 
Personnel 
 
Total number of personnel:    651 
 
Division of personnel: 
Military      30  
Civilian     621 
 
Division of personnel by category: 
Scientists      466 
Engineers      47 
Technicians      51 
Administrative and support staff   57 
 
Scientific disciplines represented:  Aerobiology, aerosol physics, 
mathematics, bacteriology, 
biochemistry, bioinformatics, 
biotechnology, chemical 
engineering, chemistry, 
forensics, immunology, medicine, 
microbiology, molecular biology, 
neuropharmacology, 
parasitology, pharmacology, 
systems biology, toxicology, 
veterinary science, virology. 
 
Source(s) of funding: Ministry of Defence 
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To generate a variety of informed perspectives on the questions asked on 
CBM A Part 2 and the typical information provided on national biodefence 
programmes, the study convened small groups of experts with mixed 
backgrounds. The use of small groups – or focus groups – collectively 
discussing a given topic through the guide of an impartial moderator is a good 
way of exploring people’s experiences, opinions, wishes and concerns, and of 
provoking narrative and reflective considerations. Group interaction is 
particularly useful for allowing people to generate their own questions, frames 
and concepts and to pursue their own priorities in their own vocabulary. 
 
Employing the mock CBM returns developed for typical small, medium and 
large biodefence programmes, the groups discussed a number of themes 
related to the quality of CBM data. Some of the key points made during the 
discussions, as well as in conversations with individual experts, are related 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
The groups were first given the slimmed-down versions of the mock CBM 
returns, and asked what they could conclude from the information provided. 
 
Small biodefence programme The majority of experts did not express 
concerns about the small biodefence programme. There were no 
dissemination activities or anything else in the mock CBM, they said, to 
suggest that the programme was on the wrong side of the offensive/ defensive 
boundary. There was wide agreement that if you did have any concerns these 
would generally be dispelled if a list of open-source publications indicating the 
research results was to be added. 
 
A number of the NAM experts did, however, note that GBP 2.14M could 
potentially make quite a large biodefence programme in their countries. A 
Western Group expert made a similar point. She said it would be more helpful 
to know the proportion of the defence budget spent on biodefence, than the 
figure on its own. So rather than merely being given a figure of GBP 2.14M, it 
would be more helpful to know if GBP 428M is spent on defence as a whole 
and 0.5% is spent specifically on biodefence, or if GBP 2.14M constitutes the 
entire defence budget and 100% of it is spent on biodefence. Knowing these 
proportions would make you think differently about the GBP 2.14M figure. In 
essence, her point was: “You need reference points to be able to put the 
information in context.” 
 
This idea of reference points came up in other discussions too. With regards 
to personnel, it was noted that rather than just knowing the number of 
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personnel involved in the biodefence programme at the facility, it would be 
more helpful to be given this figure in proportion to the total number of 
personnel working at the facility. Others said they would like to know whether 
the 20 people are working full time or, say, only 5% of their time. Or, put 
differently, whether this was really 20 people or whether it represents 60 
people devoting a third of their time. The distribution of scientists according to 
disciplines was also mentioned as more helpful information than what is 
currently provided in the CBMs. “Rather than being told there are 14 
scientists, 1 engineer and 4 technicians and being given a list of the 
disciplines represented,” one expert said, “I would like to know, for example, if 
10 of the scientists are working in toxicology and the remaining few in the 
other disciplines, because that tells you a great deal about the focus or 
emphasis of the programme.” Being given a breakdown of the number of 
personnel working in each of the BSL2 and BSL3 laboratories was felt to be 
another helpful reference point, to provide some coherence between the 
square meters of laboratory space and the personnel working there.  
 
A slightly different concern that also came up in the discussion about BSL 
laboratories was that merely knowing the BSL classification of a laboratory 
does not tell you very much in and of itself. Many of the NAM experts, for 
example, said that BSL classification is not particularly indicative of the 
research or the biological agents that are worked with in their countries. As 
one expert succinctly put it: “The BSL classification might just be an indication 
of how much money you have.” While Junin, for example, might be classified 
as a risk group 4 agent to be worked with in BSL4 facilities, some countries 
work with Junin in BSL2 facilities simply because the virus is endemic in their 
country and the work necessary, but they do not have access to laboratories 
with a higher BSL classification. Similarly, it was also remarked that we should 
not assume that BSL2 or BSL3 laboratories in advanced countries necessarily 
equate with BSL2 or BSL3 laboratories in developing countries, as 
infrastructure and working practices might differ significantly. So while it is 
useful to know BSL classifications of facilities, it was suggested that it might 
be more helpful to ask for the number of facilities dealing with highly 
dangerous pathogens than to ask for the square-meters of BSL2, BSL3 and 
BSL4 laboratories. 
 
In two of the groups, there was some disagreement on the proportion of 
scientists to technicians listed in the small biodefence programme. While 
some felt that the ratio of 14 scientists to 4 technicians was feasible, others 
felt it didn’t seem quite right. One commented: “This would only happen in a 
university! In a defence lab you’d have 14 scientists and 14 technicians 
because scientists are so much more expensive.”  
 
A final point worth highlighting on the small biodefence programme was that 
some of the experts felt the programme’s research on detection and medical 
countermeasures could very well be conducted in institutes other than the 
Ministry of Defence, such as in Department of Health facilities or in university 
laboratories, and that that was actually increasingly the case. In line with this, 
one expert noted that with only one biological warfare agent studied 
(Francisella tularensis) it didn’t seem much of a biodefence programme at all. 
Responding to this another expert said the programme was probably primarily 
focused on ‘proof of principle’ work, but there was some disagreement on 
whether ‘proof of principle’ biodefence work was feasible without pathogens. 
 
Medium-sized biodefence programme Looking at the mock CBM of the 
medium-sized biodefence programme the experts did not generally express 
any major concerns either. Many would have wanted to see a more detailed 
description of the programme, but again noted that additional information in 
the form of a list of publications – either articles or research reports – would 
probably go far to allay any potential concerns. The research description 
“Studies on the mode of action and toxicity of toxins and the mode of action 
and infectivity of biological agents” was thought particularly ambiguous. 
Rather than just researching the infectivity of existing pathogens, it could 
suggest that the programme was trying to make a pathogen more infectious 
and testing it. Publications indicating otherwise could alleviate this concern. 
However, complicating the matter somewhat, it was also noted that making a 
pathogen more infectious and testing it to get an idea of the increased hazard 
this would cause could quite legitimately be done if a State had specific 
intelligence that this might be a threat. 
 
In one of the groups, the question about who is counted as military and who is 
counted as civilian came up. Are civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence 
to be counted as military, or does ‘military’ just refer to uniformed personnel? 
Interpretation of the term was considered important because while the experts 
in the group generally thought of ‘military’ as uniformed armed forces and 
‘civilian’ as everyone else including non-uniformed employees of the Ministry 
of Defence, others might think of it differently – thus inflating the number of 
military personnel they put down on their CBM declarations leading to 
misinterpretation by those analysing the forms. But what would more or less 
military involvement really tell you? One expert answered not too much, 
because some countries just have a higher military to civilian ratio in their 
biodefence programme than others, and this is not an indication of activities in 
contravention of the Convention. Another said that the breakdown within the 
military personnel might actually be of more interest: How many medical 
researchers are there? How many uniformed military, defence scientists, 
veterinarians? How many work on policy? “If, for example, they are all medics, 
that will tell you one thing,” he said, “but if a large proportion of the personnel 
is from artillery weapons research, that would tell you an entirely different 
story.” What he wanted the CBMs to tell him was whether the military was 
directly engaged in the programme, and, if so, in what capacity, in the policy 
work or in the scientific work. A related issue that came up was whether there 
was a way to capture the extent of non-funded military involvement in the 
CBMs as this too was considered useful information not currently provided on 
the forms.  
 
The discussion on how to interpret the term ‘military’ led on to discussions 
about the importance of contextualisation. It matters who interprets the CBMs. 
As one expert said: “You always have a partial way of looking at the 
information, depending on your angle. A research scientist will have one way 
for example, while an intelligence officer might have a more suspicious frame 
of mind.” Another problem that was highlighted in interpreting the CBMs is that 
people are looking at them in the context of their own programme with their 
own definitions in mind. To properly analyse a CBM return, you need an 
understanding of the particular country’s state structures and funding sources, 
of the organisations involved and their locations, of the level of infrastructure, 
of the institutional affiliation of the facilities, and of the level of involvement of 
contractors and manufacturers. “They’re all important pieces of the puzzle.” 
 
Large biodefence programme More concern was generally expressed about 
the large biodefence programme, typically because of its sheer size and 
because of the types of agents used, the field-testing and aerobiology, and 
the number of personnel involved. 
 
Returning to the idea of contextualisation, several of the experts highlighted 
that the level of concern depended a great deal on which State Party’s 
programme this was. As one expert put it: “You don’t analyse the information 
with a neutral frame of mind. If you know the State Party it changes how you 
interpret the information. It is about intent and your level of confidence in the 
State Party.” Referring to the scope and description of the programme, 
another expert noted that just because the information obtained from aerosol 
releases could be used for offensive purposes, it would not necessarily 
indicate an offensive programme. “You would therefore ask yourself,” he said, 
“whether the State Party was an ally. If it is, then it would probably share the 
results with you. If it is not, you would probably be much more suspicious.”  
 
The sharing of information between States through means other than the 
CBM mechanism also came up in the discussion around the particular agents 
used in the programme. Studies on viruses like Ebola, Marburg and Junin can 
be completely legitimate and purely defensive, but – because of the misuse 
potential of the information – you would not necessarily use open-source 
publications with detailed information on results like survivability as a way to 
allay concerns about the programme: “You don’t want to provide a recipe 
book for terrorists.” So, in this case, rather than asking for such studies to be 
published in the open literature or asking for more information to be supplied 
on the CBMs, you could obtain more information through bilateral 
consultations.  
 
One of the experts also brought up the more formal consultation and 
clarification mechanism agreed at the Third Review Conference 1991. If State 
Party X was concerned about State Party Y’s programme, and bilateral or 
other consultations were insufficient to allay any concerns, State Party Y could 
request the Depositaries to convene a consultative meeting. Specialised 
assistance may then be requested to clarify any ambiguities and unresolved 
matters through appropriate international procedures within the framework of 
the United Nations. 
 
The mock CBM for the large biodefence programme also brought about 
discussion on the need, or not, to list the specific biological agents used in 
biodefence programmes. Some of the experts were concerned about listing 
agents for security reasons, and suggested adequate information could be 
conveyed by just noting the risk groups of the organisms worked with. Instead 
of stating that work is carried out with “Bacillus anthracis and viruses such as 
Junin, Hantaan, Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley fever, Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis and the rikettsiae Coxiella burnetii” as the mock CBM of the large 
biodefence programme does, it would, they argued, suffice to say that work is 
carried out with organisms from risk groups 3 and 4. One of the experts went 
on to say that the disciplines represented are actually of much greater interest 
than the organisms used, because disciplines give an indication of what can 
and cannot be done with the material. 
 
 
 
 
 
Later in the discussions, the groups were provided with the extended version 
of the CBM return for the medium-sized biodefence programme and asked 
whether the additional information provided any new insights or raised any 
new concerns. 
 
One expert noted that the new information on the biodefence work carried out 
– particularly the work on the inhalation toxicity of a wide range of materials 
and the aerosol survival of pathogenic bacteria – raised some concerns in that 
the information gained had a large potential for misuse. While all the work 
could be justified as defensive, the results, especially the aerosolability 
results, could also be useful in the early stages of an offensive programme. 
Publications were once again noted as helpful in building confidence and 
making it more clear that the programme was carrying out bona fide defensive 
research. 
 
A number of experts raised the importance of knowing the name and location 
of the facility, which hadn’t been supplied in the slimmed-down version of the 
CBM. There was some disagreement on whether the coordinates were 
needed or not, but it was generally recognised that the name and address 
(and website if appropriate) were key in finding out more information and, for 
larger programmes, getting a sense of how different facilities were related. 
Ideally, you would also want information on the physical information of the 
facility and whether there are sub-units within a larger facility. The suggestion 
was made that an orientation map and facility diagram could helpfully be 
added to the CBMs, detailing the entire declared facility, and all relevant 
buildings, rooms and other structures. One expert from a less developed 
country said, however, that because of the low levels of security at their 
biodefence facility, her country was unwilling to make the physical address 
public, and even uncomfortable about sharing it with States Parties through 
the CBM mechanism. 
 
The extended CBM also provided information on contractors, which many 
agreed was crucial. Subcontracting to universities or private companies was 
generally felt to be an indication that the research was less secretive. “It tells 
you something if the programme is 90% military or 90% subcontracted,” one 
expert said. “Contracts lend a degree of transparency or at least give good 
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pointers as to how the programme is structured.” Subcontracting also allows 
you to check for joint publications and can be, as another expert said, “a route 
to finding out more about the organisation”. Adding a specific question on the 
percentage of subcontracting going to foreign institutions was thought to be 
useful as a way of indicating the level of foreign involvement. The degree of 
international collaboration can tell you something about the level of openness 
of the programme: “about the amount of money going out and the number of 
personnel coming in.” It was also thought of interest to know which countries 
were working together, “and if countries decline to answer, that would be an 
interesting finding too.” 
 
Other experts highlighted that additional information does not necessarily give 
you more insight. As one expert said, “If you’re trying to hide something you 
can just make up more things.” It was generally agreed, though, that if you are 
trying to hide a programme, it tends to be better to omit things than to make 
things up. This is because the more information you have the more 
opportunities you have to corroborate and cross-check that information. This 
is especially the case if the information indicates the degree of openness of 
the programme, as information about subcontractors does. Closed 
programmes without collaborators and publications in the open-source 
literature “automatically make you less confident.” 
 
The discussion on the usefulness of additional information led naturally onto a 
discussion about whether CBMs could ever provide sufficient information to 
be confident that the programmes described were not offensive. In the groups 
it was repeatedly emphasised that there is no one piece of additional 
information that by itself can provide you with a definite conclusion: “There’s 
not one thing that’s the key answer.” Rather, you have to ask yourself whether 
it all “hangs together,” whether there is “an internal logic,” whether “there is 
coherence in terms of scale, activities, scientific effort and outputs,” whether 
there is consistency between CBM A and the information provided on the 
other forms, whether current submissions are consistent with past 
submissions, and whether CBM information matches up with information from 
other sources, both open and closed. These are the real questions that 
enable you to start interpreting the offensive/ defensive boundary, and the 
reason why individual bits of CBM information are characterised as only “part 
of the puzzle.” 
 
This is also why many of the experts agreed that CBMs would not engender a 
false sense of security. “CBMs are important to get more information that you 
can corroborate, but they don’t necessarily generate a likelihood of knowing 
about an offensive programme.” However, it was also pointed out that the 
utility of the CBMs is strongly influenced by the sincerity by which they are put 
together. Incomplete and inaccurate CBM submissions offer little assurance of 
compliance, and may even diminish confidence and increase suspicion. 
Indeed, one expert went so far as to say that since there are no checks and 
balances on the CBM reporting system, people can put down what they want 
to put down. “We all know of countries that claim that they’ve never had 
programmes, and yet facts tend to argue against that. But, in their CBMs 
every year, they report nothing’s going on.” He went on to stress, though, that 
“what the CBMs do allow you to do is to obtain information from those 
countries who are amenable to sharing information – so while it is not a form 
of assurance, the CBM mechanism does encourage cooperation and the 
sharing of information.” Another expert highlighted the value of CBMs in 
getting State Parties to review their own biodefence programmes on an 
annual basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
It was repeatedly noted in the discussions that the CBM mechanism should 
not be viewed as a tool to uncover offensive programmes or activities in 
contravention of the Biological Weapons Convention. The CBMs are first and 
foremost a transparency measure aimed at building confidence. The regular 
exchange of data on current activities strengthens the regime of compliance 
by maximising the transparency of national patterns of normal activity. Annual 
declarations are of the utmost importance so that deviations from the norm 
can be identified and figures can be compared over time to see if particular 
programmes are expanding or not. Transparency is particularly important in 
terms of research on topics of relevance to the BWC, as the CBM mechanism 
was to some extent intended to compensate for the absence of constraints on 
research in the Convention (which covers development but not research). 
 
How can we increase transparency and strengthen confidence? When asked 
this question, the experts, almost without exception, answered that the CBM 
mechanism will only command limited confidence until more States Parties 
honour their commitments and submit declarations. Indeed, ignoring the 
mechanism weakens the concept of CBMs and may ultimately reduce, rather 
than build, confidence among States. It was emphasised that CBM 
requirements are not constraints on action but declarations of openness, and 
that a failure to honour commitments under the mechanism indicates either a 
lack of interest in openness or a lack of belief in the regime of compliance. 
 
Increasing participation in the CBM mechanism was, however, not the only 
means expressed by which to improve transparency and strengthen 
confidence. It was generally recognised that a review of the questions asked 
on the forms and a modernisation of the reporting process was needed, but 
most agreed that more detailed or more intrusive questions would not be 
feasible. Asking for more detailed information might make States less inclined 
to participate, or result in less information submitted than at present. It would 
also increase translation costs, and, as an intelligence officer noted, “more 
information can actually muddle the picture by giving you more avenues for 
interpretation and less ability to eliminate all the possibilities.” Others noted 
that more detailed information might mean that those States Parties who 
interpret transparency in a broad sense and who currently make their CBMs 
publicly available, might have to reappraise whether to continue doing so. The 
idea of two separate returns was raised – one for States Parties and one for 
the public – but this was not considered a particularly good solution. There 
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was also general agreement among the experts that the CBM questions 
cannot be slimmed down beyond what is currently asked. As one expert put it: 
 
“People tend to have very strong opinions that the CBMs are either not 
revealing enough or that they are revealing too much. Those that feel 
that they are not revealing enough would like to see a lot more detail in 
the CBMs. Those people who feel they reveal too much would like to 
see less information there. So I think we’ve reached a good middle 
ground.” 
 
Yet, while the level of detail asked for on the CBMs was generally considered 
appropriate, many felt that a review was needed of the questions asked. It 
was thought, for instance, that some of the questions could helpfully be 
clarified: Who is to be counted as military and who is to be counted as 
civilian? Is it necessary to list the specific biological agents worked with or do 
risk group indications suffice? Does the “total number of personnel” refer to 
person years or to the number of employees working at the facility? A number 
of the questions were also seen to require some form of modification to 
provide more meaningful answers. Examples raised in the discussions 
included asking for: the proportion of the defence budget spent on biodefence 
instead of the biodefence budget figure on its own, the distribution of scientists 
according to disciplines rather than merely the disciplines represented, the 
number of facilities dealing with highly dangerous pathogens and the number 
of personnel involved rather than the square-meters of BSL2, BSL3 and BSL4 
laboratories, and the capacity in which the military is involved rather than just 
whether it is involved in the biodefence programme. Finally, there were also 
some questions not currently asked that it was thought would significantly 
increase the level of transparency provided by the CBMs. These included 
questions on: whether aerosol testing is carried out, the number and species 
of animals used in biodefence research per year, the proportion of open-
source to internal/ restricted publications at a facility, non-funded military 
involvement in the biodefence programme, the percentage of subcontracting 
going to foreign institutions, the scale of clinical trials related to the biodefence 
programme. 
 
The experts were also unanimously agreed that the reporting process needed 
modernisation. Most encouraged the development of electronic submission 
forms and a user-friendly, web-based information management system. It was 
felt that standardised forms and a simpler submission process would increase 
the likelihood of more States participating, and would make it easier to 
analyse CBMs, especially where language was a concern. Many urged the 
adoption of tick boxes and pull-down menus to simplify data entry and to 
improve the visibility of key data, as well as help functions and indicators to 
signal where to go next or where data still needs to be filled in. 
 
While these examples of revisions and modifications to the forms and the 
CBM reporting process can only give an indication of the sort of changes 
experts feel would be helpful in increasing transparency and strengthening 
confidence, they provide a modest starting point for future discussions on the 
kind and quality of the information exchanged through the CBM mechanism. It 
is hoped that these suggestions, together with the preceding discussion on 
interpreting CBM information and the quantitative data on biodefence 
programmes and maximum containment facilities, can input into any future 
revisions to the forms considered appropriate by the States Parties. 
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contributing their CBMs; the experts and officials involved for the insights they 
provided and for so generously giving up their time to participate in the study; 
my colleagues, in particular Riccarda Torriani and Reto Wollenmann, for their 
substantial efforts, contributions and translations; my research assistant, 
Caitlin Cockerton, for her excellent work and enthusiasm; and the Political 
Affairs Secretariat of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for its 
support of the project. 
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• Since the current forms were introduced in 1991, there has been an 
increase both in the number of States Parties declaring maximum 
containment facilities on CBM A Part 1 and in the number of maximum 
containment facilities declared. In 2007, 40 States Parties declared a 
total of 268 facilities, up from 26 States Parties declaring 115 facilities 
in 1992. Of the facilities declared only a small number are categorised 
as BSL4, the majority (around 80 percent) of the facilities have a lower 
BSL level. 
 
• There has also been a gradual increase in the number of biodefence 
programmes declared on CBM A Part 2, from 13 programmes in 1992 
to 25 programmes in 2007. 
 
• National biodefence programmes can be categorised as small, medium 
and large as a helpful way to discuss the typical kinds of information 
and level of detail submitted by States Parties on their CBM returns. 
 
• To properly interpret CBM returns, you need to be able to contextualise 
the information provided in terms of the particular state structures and 
funding sources, the organisations involved and their locations, the 
level of infrastructure, the institutional affiliation of the facilities, and the 
level of involvement of contractors and manufacturers. 
 
• There is not one piece of information that by itself can provide 
confidence that programmes and activities are not in contravention of 
the Convention. Individual pieces of information are only “part of the 
puzzle.” 
 
• Additional information does not necessarily give you more insight, but it 
provides more opportunities to corroborate and cross-check 
information. 
 
• Key to improving transparency and strengthening confidence between 
States Parties is to increase the level of participation in the CBM 
mechanism. CBM requirements are not constraints on action but 
declarations of openness, and a failure to honour commitments under 
the mechanism indicates either a lack of interest in openness or a lack 
of belief in the regime of compliance. 
 
• The regular exchange of data on current activities strengthens the 
regime of compliance by maximising the transparency of national 
patterns of normal activity. Complete, accurate and annual declarations 
are of the utmost importance so that deviations from the norm can be 
identified and information can be compared over time. 
 
• A review of the questions asked on the CBM forms and a 
modernisation of the reporting process is called for. 
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